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1. Introduction
Learning is an important feature of human behavior. Most social scientists and many economists
agree. Since learning is a relatively new topic in economics, there is a large variety of approaches
that are not easy to classify (see FUDENBERG & LEVINE, 1998, for a comprehensive overview of
learning in games). Each approach involves different methods, and – most importantly– pursues
goals that may be different. Hence, one difficulty with the current learning literature is that it is
often not clear what a given theory aims to explain beyond some narrowly defined theoretical or
technical problem. Thus, I maintain that the literature would benefit greatly from making the
aims that an approach or theory pursues more explicit, not only at a technical level, but also with
respect to some phenomenon to be explained. My suspicion, however, is that much effort is
directed toward improving theory for theoretical reasons, not toward explaining observable
phenomena.
Thus, I am wondering what the learning literature has to offer to the average member of the
average economic department. I believe that a better job should be done in explaining why
learning processes are important in economics more generally, and what kinds of results learning
theory has produced that are of interest to economist not specialized in this field. To do so, one
has to ask what can be learned from learning in theory and in experiments, and how these results
relate to real-world situations. 
What are the contributions of learning theory to economic theory more generally? That is: why
should a theorist care? – How relevant are our results to explain real phenomena and how can
these results be applied? That is: why should an applied economist bother? In sum: what are the
robust findings we can tell our colleagues about? Or is learning just another highly specialized
field that only insiders care about?
I cannot offer any definite answers to these questions. Instead, in this paper I shall outline
some current issues in economic learning, mainly from a behavioral perspective. This perspective
maintains that theories about (human) behavior, –such as economic theories– can be improved
by providing a stronger empirical basis through careful observation of actual behavior and by
confronting theory with evidence. The aim of the behavioral (not behavioristic) approach is to
broaden the view on economic behavior and go beyond the arm-chair reasoning of much
economic theorizing. This is not to disregard the value or role of pure theory as a benchmark
–telling us how behavior should be under mostly ideal assumptions and conditions at the limit–,
but to put this theory on a stronger behavioral basis by including psychological insights collected
in experiments and the field. Clearly, the aim of such effort is not only to improve theory but also
to apply it to observable phenomena, and to highlight the limits it is subject to. – 3 –
1The first view has been attributed to Reinhard Selten, e.g. by GEOREE & HOLT (1999a) who favor the second view,
which is also typical for the work of Ido Erev and Al Roth (see EREV & ROTH, 1998).
With regard to learning behavior, for example, the question arises in which cases or under
what circumstances one can be confident that the strong assumptions made in theory do hold:
“The assumption that conduct is prompt and rational is in all cases a fiction. But it proves
to be sufficiently near to reality, if things have had time to hammer logic into men. Where
this has happened, and within the limits in which it has happened, one may rest content
with this fiction and build theories upon it.“ Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 80; first published 1911)
It seems important to note that most traditional and learning theory does not include statements
about the circumstances or situations in which the involved assumptions are supposed to hold.
Hence, the limits imposed by these assumptions are usually not discussed – especially not with
regard to learning behavior and learning conditions. The basic question is when and under what
circumstances we can be confident that “things have had time to hammer logic into men.“ From
a behavioral view it seems that many theories make bolder claims than can be supported by
behavioral evidence, not only with respect to cognitive abilities and capacities (hence, the
rationality assumption), but also with respect to situational constraints for learning. The role of
these constraints, that is of learning conditions, will be the main theme of this paper.
In Section 2 the existing learning literature will briefly be summarized and commented on.
Section 3 focuses on some aspects of learning “in practice“ that deserve more attention than
usually attributed in theory. In Section 4 some problems of learning in experiments will be
discussed, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Learning in Theory
As mentioned in the introduction, the goals one pursues when doing theory may differ
substantially. There are at least two general views on (game) theory: 
view A) Game theory is for doing theory, not for playing games.
view B) We need a theory for playing games, not just for doing theory!
It does not always seem clear which of these two extremes a given theory belongs to.
1 Some
(possibly most) theories have purely theoretical aims, while others are inspired by empirical
findings. Still others mainly focus on observable behavior and are able to organize experimental
data quite well. But since the results of “horse races“ among theories in the laboratory are still
mixed, it remains an open question which approach fits best for which type of situation or– 4 –
2Recent experimental studies on imitation include HUCK, NORMANN & OECHSSLER (1999) and BOSCH & VRIEND
(1999).
3On the sub-field of evolutionary game theory, see WEIBULL (1995) and SAMUELSON (1997).
“overall“. An additional unsettled question is if and to what extent the results of “fit-theory-to-
data exercises“ can be applied to a wider range of phenomena possibly outside the laboratory (i.e,
the question of the external validity of results).
Today, the literature offers a variety of approaches to learning in economics or in games. There
are two branches of mainly theoretical approaches (view A above). The first involves individual-
based learning mechanisms, while the second focuses on the aggregate level. In contrast,
experimental approaches support view B, in that they aim to account for behavior observable in
laboratory experiments. In the same vein, behavioral approaches are based on behavioral
evidence and include findings that are considered robust in psychology. In addition, the
contingent learning approach discussed below stresses the importance of learning conditions.
Individual Level Approaches
Approaches of individual learning model learning behavior of a representative actor, in that some
rule or mechanism is introduced according to which the actor updates his beliefs when new
information about the environment arrives. Typical statistical rules include Bayesian (or
“rational“) learning or least-squares learning (see BLUME & EASLEY, 1995). In imitation
learning, actors are thought to copy the behavior of others, especially behavior that is popular
or appears to yield high payoffs (see e.g., SCHLAG, 1998 and 1999).
2 In models of best reply
learning, actors behave more strategically, in that they aim to maximize their payoffs given their
expectations about what others will do. In simple versions of this type of learning, known as
“fictitious play“, actors choose their best reply to the observed frequency distribution of their
opponents‘ previous actions (see e.g., YOUNG, 1998). 
Aggregate Level Approaches
It is typical for aggregate level approaches that actors or players are assumed to interact
repeatedly within (possibly large) populations. In evolutionary approaches, actors are usually
programmed to behave in a given and fixed manner or to play a certain strategy.
3 Actors that use
a higher-than-average-payoff strategy are at a reproductive advantage so that their frequency
within the population increases over time. The most widely used model is known as the
“replicator dynamics“ (see FUDENBERG & LEVINE, 1998, pp. 51). It assumes that the growth rate
of a certain player type or strategy in a population is a linear function of its payoff relative to the
average payoff. – Also at the aggregate level, there are approaches that model learning in neural– 5 –
networks (e.g., RUMELHARD & MCCLELLAND, 1986) or via genetic algorithms (e.g., HOLLAND,
1975).
Equilibrium Selection and Equilibrium Concepts
Note that most theoretical approaches – be it at the individual or at the aggregate level – have
mainly been motivated by multiple equilibria in games (or in rational expectations models). Thus,
they focus on well-defined equilibrium selection processes. The driving force behind such effort
is rooted in the very concept of equilibrium in that most economists perceive it as their duty to
find and formally describe some state where behavior is no longer modified (and possibly no
more learning occurs). The two most basic concepts are the market equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium.
In non-strategic settings of simple dependence like perfect markets with an atomistic structure,
free information, homogeneous goods, and costless transactions adjustment or learning is
relatively straightforward because there is only one observational variable, namely the market
price, and only one behavioral variable, namely the quantity that is supplied or demanded. Market
equilibrium is reached simply via adjustment of quantities if the current price is above or below
the equilibrium price.
In contrast, in strategic settings of interdependence –typically modeled as games– adaption
or learning is often not so simple since the “environment“ is not only reacting to a player‘s
behavior, it is also acting strategically and may anticipate behavior. This introduces strategic
uncertainty about the behavior of others, which may complicate learning substantially. The most
basic equilibrium concept in game theory –and possibly in economic theory– is the Nash
equilibrium. It describes a situation in which none of the involved players (or market
participants) has an incentive to change her current behavior given that all others do not change
their current behaviors either (see e.g., BINMORE, 1992, for a formal definition). 
The problem with this concept, however, is that it does not include any statements about how
a Nash equilibrium is reached. Also, even in simple 2 x 2 matrix games with only 2 players and
2 strategies more than one Nash equilibrium may exist. Therefore most theory focuses on the
following question: “Suppose that players reach a Nash equilibrium, and suppose that there are
several Nash equilibria, which Nash equilibrium is most likely to be reached?“ The majority of
literature aims to answer this question via theoretical refinements of the Nash concept or by
introducing alternative equilibrium concepts (see FUDENBERG & TIROLE, 1992, for an overview
of the refinement literature), while the learning literature tries to answer it via some learning
mechanism (see MAILATH, 1998, for a survey).
Logically prior to the refinement question, however, is the question “When or under what
circumstances does learning lead to Nash equilibrium?“ This question, again, stresses the
importance of learning conditions, and it has recently been addressed by BÖRGERS (1999) who– 6 –
4Hence, reinforcement learning implies that people ignore information about behavior and outcomes of others, even
if this information is free. Therefore, people are assumed to be unaware of whether they are trading in a market,
playing a game or facing an individual decision making task (see also OCHS, 1999).
presents a list of factors that are assumed to determine whether subjects approach Nash
equilibrium in experiments. This list is somewhat similar to the list of learning determinants
presented in the contingent learning approach below, and Börger‘s approach seems one of the
rare exceptions where theorists aim to address the basic question of learning conditions.
Aside from the last mentioned efforts, theoretical learning approaches are mostly not
motivated by some behavioral or psychological criticism, and are not based on behavioral
theories or empirical evidence about human learning. Hence, it appears that most of these
analyses aim to predict behavior entirely by theory. Furthermore, definite predictions usually hold
only under strong assumptions that may be reasonable in some ideal situations, but are unrealistic
and potentially misleading for many applications. There seems to be an evident lack of
knowledge about some of the very principles that govern learning behavior that requires not only
theoretical progress, but also systematic observation and careful empirical work (see CRAWFORD,
1995).
Experimental Approaches
This type of approach aims to model how people behave or play games in experimental
laboratories. Hence, they support view B mentioned above. The most often studied theory is
reinforcement learning which basically assumes that people adopt actions or strategies that have
been successful in the past. This assumption is one of the cornerstones of behavioral psychology,
and it is based on the “Law of Effect” (Thorndike, 1898). Reinforcement learning has widely
been studied in animals and humans by psychologists, and has attracted the attention of
economists (see EREV & ROTH, 1998). This type of learning is non-cognitive in that individuals
do not systematically reflect their behavior, but simply use any high-payoff strategy with
increasing probability regardless of the situation.
4 It has therefore been labeled a “low rationality
theory“ (see ROTH & EREV, 1995). Reinforcement learning is also non-strategic because actors
are assumed to consider only their own actions and outcomes, not those of others. This is a main
difference to models of best reply learning, like fictitious play, where actors are assumed to know
and consider the actions and payoffs of others.
Another experimentally oriented approach is the learning direction theory, proposed by
Reinhard Selten (see SELTEN & STOECKER, 1986). It is based on the idea that after some
experience, people think about what might have been a better decision last time, and then adjust
their behavior in that direction (SELTEN & BUCHTA, 1999). Hence, directional learning makes
only qualitative predictions, but does not attempt to predict the amount of change.– 7 –
5Explorative experiments in areas where little or no theory is available are difficult to publish since referees feel
uncomfortable when they have no sound theory to compare the results with. Thus, learning under less than ideal
conditions is rarely studied per se in experiments. On the other hand, however, there are some experiments that
provide “bad“ learning conditions, as will be discussed below in Section 4 for the case of decision making under
risk.
These and other approaches have been experimentally tested many times (see e.g., STAHL,
1996; DUFFY & NAGEL 1997; HO ET AL. 1998). To date, it seems fair to conclude that different
learning models are able to describe experimental behavior in various contexts. Especially
reinforcement learning seems to perform surprisingly well in many environments, while Bayesian
learning, fictitious play, and Cournot dynamics are usually not supported by the data (see also
NAGEL, 1999). However, learning appears to be highly sensitive to learning conditions and
information, at least in some situations (see e.g., HUCK ET AL. 1999). None of the leading
frameworks gives a fully reliable account of behavior by itself and “...most behavior can be
understood in terms of a synthesis of ideas from those frameworks, combined with empirical
knowledge in proportions that depend in predictable ways on the environment (CRAWFORD,
1995, 3). Hence, one would like to have a unified approach that includes criteria when to employ
which theory or which element(s) of existing theories contingent on the situation or environment
in question.
A Behavioral Approach: Contingent Learning
One attempt in this direction is to start from behavioral features documented in the psychological
literature. For example, it is well known in this literature that decision making is contingent on
the environment or situation (see HOGARTH & REDER, 1987; PAYNE, 1982). Therefore, it seems
natural to assume that learning is contingent on the situation as well.
This idea has motivated the contingent learning approach (SLEMBECK, 1998a), who studies
the role of situational characteristics as restrictions to learning. As will be discussed in Section
3, in most practical situations or applications conditions for learning are far less ideal than
assumed in standard and learning theories where learning is often unconstrained with respect to
these conditions. Regarding learning in experiments (see Section 4) it should be noted that also
most experiments provide the same type of ideal learning conditions as assumed in theory,
because many experimenters aim at “speaking to theorists“ instead of “searching for facts“
(ROTH, 1995, 22).
5 
The basic question which the contingent learning approach tries to answer is how learning
behavior depends on learning conditions. These conditions can be understood as situational
restrictions to learning, in addition to the cognitive restrictions that approaches of bounded
rationality aim to account for. The learning process is modeled as a learning loop (or spiral) that


























Figure 1: A Learning Loop.
type of
determinant







complexity of environment and task x x x
information about structure x x x
degree of dependency x x
uncertainty
structural uncertainty x x x
interaction
determinants
strategic uncertainty  (x)
h x
feedback information x x x
h In perfectly competitive markets strategic uncertainty does not exist but emerges as behavior becomes
   interdependent with a decreasing number of actors.
 Table 1: Overview of Learning Determinants
individual gains experience by applying behavioral strategies out of an existing repertoire to
some situation, and receiving feedback about the consequences. This process continues and
behavior is modified as long as some aspiration level is not satisfied or some maximal utility is
not reached. The repertoire of behavioral strategies is modified and enlarged as experience
accumulates.
The situation is characterized by five main learning determinants, namely by (i) the
complexity of the environment and of the task, (ii) the degree of dependency among actors
induced by the number of involved actors, (iii) the available information about structure of the
situation, (iv) structural and strategic uncertainty, and (v) quality, quantity and content of
feedback. Table 1 gives an overview of these determinants with regard to their occurrence in
three types of situations, i.e. individual decision tasks, markets, and games.– 9 –
Similar to directional learning, contingent learning makes qualitative predictions about the
influence of these learning conditions with regard to the effectiveness of learning processes (see
SLEMBECK, 1998a for details). The approach has been tested in a number of experiments
(SLEMBECK, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b;  SLEMBECK  &  BINMORE, 1999). The results stress the
importance of structural information, structural uncertainty and feedback for adaptive behavior.
In sum, behavior may differ substantially from theory predictions when the structure of the
situation is not completely known or uncertain, and when feedback is deficient. Strategic
uncertainty, however, seems to play a decreasing role as subjects gain experience, which is true
to a lesser degree for structural uncertainty. Furthermore, qualitatively and quantitatively
improved feedback can yield behavior that is closer to theory prediction in experiments that are
usually run under “low“ feedback conditions (see Section 4 for details).
3. Aspects of Learning in “Practice“
In real-life there exist some simple facts that make the importance of learning obvious. Firstly,
people are born as babies, thus they have to learn to behave “optimally“ and what they like.
There is evidence that even adults don‘t have given (and fixed) preferences for each option they
encounter in life. Thus, they have to learn what they like, and construct their preferences in a
particular situation (see e.g., LOOMES, 1999, F37).
Time and Opportunities
Aside from the question of preferences, people live in a dynamic or evolving world where
relative prices, opportunities for production and consumption, available information, and various
economic restrictions (such as budgets) change all the time in the economic realm. However, in
all practical situations there is limited time and opportunity for an individual to learn. Much of
what people know, believe to know or have learnt is not acquired by personal experience but
transmitted socially. Thus, most real-life learning involves social interaction that goes beyond
simple imitation of successful behavior. Limited time and opportunity for individual learning
means also that “maximal learning“ –as often assumed in theory– is rarely “optimal“ since time,
cognitive effort etc. employed in learning processes are scarce resources that need to be
economized on.
Availability of Feedback
One important aspect of limited opportunities in real-life learning is the availability of feedback.
It has long been recognized in the psychology literature that effective learning takes place only
under certain conditions in that it requires accurate and immediate feedback about the relation
between the situational conditions and the appropriate response (see EINHORN & HOGARTH,
1978; TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, 1987, 90). – 10 –
In most practical situations, however, quality and quantity of feedback – e.g., to managers,
entrepreneurs and politicians – is much lower than commonly assumed in economic theory
because:
• outcomes are delayed and not easily attributable to particular actions
• variability in the environment may degrade the reliability of the feedback, especially where
outcomes of low probability are involved, or/and when feedback is delayed
• there is often no information about what the outcome would have been if another decision had
been taken
• most important decisions are unique and therefore provide little opportunity for learning.
Do Markets Heal?
The above list reflects a view that focuses on the individual, which is typical for psychologists.
Economists, on the other hand, tend to focus on markets or aggregate outcomes instead of
individual behavior. Economists have argued that evolutionary or market forces select “fit“
actors. Hence, it is assumed that (competitive) markets provide an environment that involves
incentives strong enough for actors to learn optimal behavior on average in the long run. This is
the same type of (evolutionary) argument that has long been used to defend the rationality
assumption in that markets are thought to “heal“ the cognitive imperfections of actors through
evolutionary forces, leading actors to behave as if they were rational.
Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. There is evidence that “anomalous“ behavior can
survive for some (possibly long) time in real markets (see the large literature on “bubbles“ and
“herding“ in markets, e.g. AVERY & ZEMSKY, 1998). – There is similar evidence from the
laboratory in that some anomalies are overcome by learning in market environments while others
are not: “The data suggest the market glass is both half-full of deviations and half-empty because
some deviations were drained away by learning“ (CAMERER, 1995, 675).
My own conclusion is that markets produce the types of learning assumed in the traditional
and in the learning literature only under very ideal conditions (such as perfect competition and
free information). These conditions are rarely met in real-life and even in experimental markets
that are slightly realistic (see SUNDER, 1995, for an overview).
Furthermore, it may take a long time for markets to converge to some equilibrium even under
ideal conditions – especially when the actors‘ initial beliefs are not coordinated. Most current
theory lacks criteria for when the long run behavior it predicts can be assumed to occur. The
practical question is how long the long run is, and whether the long run matters with respect to
a given question or phenomenon.
Therefore, when applying learning approaches to real phenomena one may question the value
of theories that make predictions for learning behavior or outcomes (equilibria) only in the long– 11 –
run. For applied work it would obviously be most useful to know something about short and
medium run behavior, and about the approximate length of these runs.
Repeated vs. One-Shot Situations
An additional aspect of “learning in practice“ is that life is on one hand a repeated game, but on
the other hand not all is repeated.
The repeated play aspect not only allows the individual to learn effectively in some situations
(like daily shopping), to form rules of thumb, and to employ heuristics that have proven to be
useful over time. It also introduces psychological or behavioral features that traditional economic
theory does not account for – like concerns for fairness, reciprocity, manners, or other social
norms that help real people to cooperate, coordinate or overcome social dilemmas in life. These
additional features challenge theory, and they show up in experiments where they sometimes
make the interpretation of observed behavior difficult. 
The one-shot aspect has already been mentioned with respect to the problem of insufficient
feedback in practical situations. Moreover, there is a general case for studying one-shot situations
or games because they may sometimes be more realistic (see e.g., LOOMES, 1999). GEOREE &
HOLT (1999b) argue that one-shot games are especially appealing because they allow us to
abstract away from issues of learning and attempts to manipulate others‘ beliefs, behavior, or
preferences (p. 29). Furthermore, psychological research suggests that transfer of learning across
situations is (at least sometimes) surprisingly weak (LOEWENSTEIN, 1999, F29). Thus, people
may find it difficult to transfer their experience from one situation to a similar or even formally
identical situation so that potentially many situations may appear one-shot to them. On the other
hand, people are confronted with new situations all the time, and two situations are never
completely identical in life. Therefore, we may expect people to be prepared for dealing with
novelty and to transfer their knowledge and beliefs between situations. Hence, for applications
to novel or one-shot situations, like international politics, election campaigns or legal disputes,
it seems important to have a theory about how people transfer their experience.
Imitation is one way to deal with novelty whenever the behavior of others can be observed.
However, theories that assume simple copying of successful behavior may be overly optimistic
for many real-life settings, since copying may be difficult or impossible in practice. For example,
it seems quite demanding to imitate or copy successful companies, entrepreneurs or sportsmen
like Michael Jordan. Therefore, imitation is regarded to be a challenging task by most social
scientists.
Overall, there appear to be good reasons for studying both, repeated and one-shot situations
or games. Economic situations may be one-shot in some (possibly important) cases, but people
are also equipped with repeated play impulses from everyday life that have proven helpful in– 12 –
other cases (GALE ET AL.,1995). They carry these impulses with them and bring them also to the
experimental laboratory (see next section). 
Furthermore, real people not only adapt to given circumstances: they create or invent new
situations, they change restrictions actively, they modify the rules of games, and they (re)design
institutions. All these features of human behavior are obviously important to economics, but
accounting for them is a very demanding task for theory. A more modest first goal would be to
make clearer statements about what type of situation (e.g., repeated or one-shot) one has in mind
when setting up a theory, and to explicitly acknowledge the theoretical and practical limits
imposed by this choice. Hence, we need distinct criteria that tell us under which circumstances
a given learning theory is thought to apply since many theories implicitly assume learning
conditions that are not discussed in theory and rarely met in practice.
4. Aspects of Learning in Experiments
In experiments, the phenomenon of learning has several facets because learning is sometimes a
nuisance factor, while it is the focus of research at other times (see e.g., FRIEDMAN & SUNDER,
1994). 
Learning as a Nuisance Factor in Experiments
On one hand, experimenters aim to make experimental subjects familiar with a new environment
and situation. They want to make sure that subjects understand the situation “correctly“ in the
sense that subjects do consider all the given information. This information is typically defined
by the model or theory under study so that not considering all information would bias the
experiment. Practice rounds are introduced for this purpose. The fact that subjects have to make
themselves familiar with the situation is a nuisance in this case, and behavior in practice rounds
is typically not reported. 
In the light of the arguments in favor of studying one-shot situations presented in the last
section, however, not reporting initial behavior may be regarded as a waste of potentially useful
information. It may in fact often be the case that experimenters have some specific sort of
experimental outcome in mind before the experiment starts – an expectation that may be fueled
by large series of pilot-experiments – so that experimenters have to wait until subjects finally
“get it right“ before starting the “real“ experiment. This is the case when a static theory is being
tested.
Learning as an Object of Experimental Study
On the other hand, there are experiments that explicitly study learning behavior. Much of the
literature on experimentally based approaches mentioned in Section 2 falls into this class. In
these experiments a one-shot game or situation is typically repeated several times. In individual– 13 –
decision making tasks repetitions are straightforward. In market or public good experiments, for
instance, learning is studied by having the same subjects interacting repeatedly. In game
experiments, however, there are two different procedures. While in most game experiments
subjects are matched newly each round, in other experiments subjects play the same stage-game
repeatedly with the same partner(s) or opponent(s). Random or rotation re-matching methods are
employed to reduce potential supergame strategies or reputation effects in most game
experiments, e.g. in bargaining. The reason is that theory often has not much to say about such
effects as accounting for them would make the analysis considerably more difficult. Thus,
experimental studies of learning and supergame behavior or the role of reputations are
surprisingly rare, although both phenomena may be important in many real-life instances such
as repeated bargaining – see e.g., SLEMBECK, 1999b, for the first ultimatum game experiment
with fixed opponents where bargaining behavior is drastically different from what has been
observed under random or rotation matching schemes. 
An unsettled problem of experimental learning studies concerns the question whether short,
medium, long, or ultra-long run behavior should be the focus of attention. ROTH & EREV (1995)
have forcefully argued in favor of the importance of medium run or “intermediate term“
behavior, but to date not everyone seems to be convinced of the argument. After all, this is a
question of the phenomenon under study or the application one has in mind. However, the
literature would benefit from making this point more explicit, since in the long run that
theoretical models often need for behavior to converge (asymptotically) to some equilibrium,
experimental subjects – and real-life actors – may long be dead.
“Stationary Replications“
Repeating an identical task or game several times in the laboratory has been criticized by
LOEWENSTEIN (1999) who labels this practice “stationary replication“. He finds that „stationary
replication is simply not a common feature of economic life..“ and „...it is by no means clear that
behaviour at the end of repetitions is more representative of actual economic behaviour than
behaviour at the beginning“ (p. F28). A somewhat contrary view is taken by HERTWIG &
ORTMANN (1998) who argue that stationary replication is a strength of experimental practices
in economics as compared to psychology.
Again, it is a question of whether we are interested in initial behavior or in the evolution of
behavior over time. Whenever we observe behavior to converge or stabilize over time this does
not necessarily mean that his behavior is more representative for actual economic behavior. Yet,
it may sometimes still be useful to study medium or long run behavior in the lab, because this
allows us to analyze and identify the conditions under which learning leads to behavioral
convergence or stabilization. Thus, I would maintain that stationary replication is a useful tool– 14 –
6LOEWENSTEIN (1999, F30): “There are four cards, each with a letter on one side and a number on the other. The
exposed faces read ‘X‘, ‘Y‘, ‘1', and ‘2'. Subjects are asked which cards would need to be turned over to test the
rule: ‘If there is an X on one side there is a 2 on the other.‘ Very few subjects give the right answer, which is X and
1. However, when the problem is put into a more familiar context (for example, there are 4 children from two
different towns and two school districts and the rule is ‘If a child lives in Concord he goes to Concord High‘), a
much higher fraction of subjects give the right answer. Subjects seem like zero intelligence agents when they are
placed in the unfamiliar and abstract context of an experiment, even if they function quite adequately in familiar
settings.“
for analyzing learning in experiments as long as one keeps in mind the limitations mentioned by
Loewenstein when interpreting experimental results and drawing conclusions for behavior
outside the laboratory. 
Binmore‘s Criteria
Several aspects of learning in experiments have been summarized recently by BINMORE (1999,
F17) who stipulates three criteria or conditions under which one can expect economic theory to
predict well:
6 make the task „reasonably“ simple
6 provide „adequate“ incentives
6 allow „sufficient“ time for learning
All three rules have to do with learning in that a reasonably simple task is easier to learn,
adequate incentives are needed to motivate sufficient learning efforts, and sufficient time for
learning must be allowed. BINMORE (1999, F18) admits that „by interpreting the criteria severely
enough, we can almost guarantee that an optimising theory will work. By interpreting them
loosely enough, we can almost guarantee that an optimising theory will fail.“
The question, then, is where the boundary between these two extremes lies. In Binmore‘s view
it is not interesting to ask whether economic theory works or not – he already knows that
sometimes it does and sometimes it does not: “The task is to classify economic environments into
those where the theory works and those were it does not. In the shady area in between, the data
obtained from the classification effort will then serve to refine the theories that do not quite make
it“ (BINMORE, 1999, F18). In this view, the role of learning conditions becomes apparent in that
behavior can be manipulated by changing these conditions – at least in the laboratory. For
applications, again, the crucial question arises when a given set of conditions is supposed to hold
and whether conditions can be manipulated by real-life actors (such as politicians) or by
“designers“ in applied market or mechanism design.
Anomalies and Learning in Individual Decision Making
Classification, however, is not always easy as experimental evidence on “Wason‘s 4-card-
problem“ (see LOEWENSTEIN, 1999, F30)
6 and the “3-doors-anomaly“ (see FRIEDMAN, 1998;– 15 –
7The situation for the three-doors-anomaly is taken from Monty Hall‘s game show “Let‘s make a deal“ where the
final guest is presented with three doors to choose from. One door hides the “grand prize“ while the others contain
worthless prizes. After the guest has chosen a door, the show master opens one of the other two doors, revealing
a worthless prize, and asks the guest whether he would like to stay with his original choice or switch to the other
unopened door. While most candidates (and experimental subjects) are reported to stay with their original choices,
switching would improve their chances of winning the grand prize from 1/3 to 2/3. FRIEDMAN (1998) has
investigated learning by providing experimental subjects with (i) intense monetary incentives, (ii) a written track
record, (iii) written advice, and (iv) comparative results of other subjects results when the task was repeated 10 to
15 times; but only about a third of his subjects learned to switch. My feeling is that many more rounds and stronger
feedback would be needed for subjects to learn that switching is advantageous. PAGE (1998) tried another version
were more doors were involved, but only when the choice set was reduced from 100 doors before the subject‘s
choice to 2 doors after picking a door a substantial number of subjects (about 80%) learned to switch.
PAGE, 1998)
7 suggests. Both types of experiments involve an individual decision task that is
reasonably simple to understand, and I assume that sufficient incentives were provided in the
experiments. While subjects were able to solve the “4-card-problem“ correctly when the task was
put in a real-life context instead of an abstract situation, the 3-doors-anomaly seems to persist
even when subjects are helped in their learning. Maybe the reason is that subjects did not receive
appropriate feedback in the experiments, or that there exists no real-life analogy to the latter
problem so that real people don‘t have a chance to “get it right“. 
As for the case of markets, some “anomalous“ behaviors in individual decision making tasks
seem to vanish while others appear to persist when subjects learn. Therefore, it remains to be
investigated more thoroughly under what conditions, learning leads to “more rational“ behavior,
i.e. to behavior that is more in accordance with economic theory. Chances are that quality,
quantity and content of feedback will prove to be among the strongest learning determinants.
This may appear a too simple and too straightforward prediction. As will be discussed in the next
paragraph, however, the role of feedback has been neglected in some important ways.
Risky Behavior and Learning with Feedback
While most experiments provide rather ideal conditions for learning, the issue of learning has
rarely been addressed in one essential area of experimental research, namely in individual
decision making under risk. Dozens of experiments have been run to test expected utility theory
(EUT) and various variants of preference functionals under risk (see e.g. HEY & ORME, 1994).
From this literature STARMER (1999, F8) has recently concluded: “One thing we have learned
for sure...is that EUT is descriptively false. Mountains of experimental evidence reveal systematic
violations of the axioms of EUT, and the more we look, the more we find.“ Similarly, LOOMES
(1999, F37) finds that “the bulk of violations of EUT are broadly robust, in that they can be
reproduced with a variety of displays and using familiar sums of money and straightforward,
easily imaginable probabilities. Nor can these effects be explained away simply in terms of lack
of incentives.“– 16 –
8In a different design BARRON & EREV (1999) have recently investigated the effect of feedback on repeated decision
making under uncertainty and risk, and compared the results with predictions of prospect theory (KAHNEMAN &
TVERSKY, 1979) and reinforcement learning theory. They argue that many important economic decisions are made
in a dynamic environment with feedback, and find that prospect theory predicts initial behavior well, while long run
behavior is more in accordance with reinforcement learning. This finding seems to be driven by the effect of
feedback.
How about learning in this context? How about looking not only at incentives but at learning
conditions such as sufficient time and feedback? In a new experiment by SLEMBECK & BINMORE
(1999) evidence collected in three countries suggests that allowing subjects to learn the
consequences of risky choices by giving them appropriate feedback and allowing them sufficient
time to revise their decisions yields behavior that is much closer to EUT than observed before.
(In the final round of the experiment 85 to 90 percent of the choices involved the expected value
maximizing option). Hence, there appear to exist conditions under which EUT can be
confirmed.
8
The question remains how relevant such a result is. On one hand it sheds additional light on
the importance of learning conditions as stressed by the contingent learning approach. On the
other hand it demonstrates that it is indeed possible to construct conditions in which theory works
well with real people. Finding such conditions is a breakthrough in that it provides an empirical
benchmark to compare theory and practice with. Hence, we at least know one set of conditions
where theory appears to work well.
An additional question is, of course, the practical relevance of such a finding. As discussed
above, many important practical decisions may lack the kind of learning opportunities provided
in our experiment. It is therefore a matter of application to determine if the involved learning
conditions can be assumed to hold. That is, for each application one has to think carefully about
the learning conditions before applying theory. It seems nevertheless very useful to know that
such conditions do exist at least in the laboratory.
Experimental Tests of Learning Theories
When looking at experimental evidence from tests of learning theories, one is currently left with
a somewhat empty feeling. As mentioned, evidence from comparisons between learning models
in experiments is inconclusive. Currently, various authors are collecting evidence in favor of one
or the other approach (see EREV & ROTH, 1998; EREV & RAPOPORT, 1998; NAGEL & TANG,
1997; VAN HUYCK ET AL., 1996; RAPOPORT ET AL., 1995). 
As the number of models and experiments to test them increases, learning mechanisms can
be expected to improve their ability to capture observed learning behavior, especially when the
performance of models is assessed not only through hypothesis testing but through competitive
tests among alternative models with respect to the same set of data. At the same time criteria for– 17 –
9Criteria for model comparison must be stipulated and tradeoffs among them must be discussed. These criteria
include, for example, the goodness-of-fit, the number of free parameters (parsimony), the economic interpretability
of these parameters, and the validation of parameters in experiments.
10These principles are likely to include the “Law of Effect” (Thorndike, 1898), the “Power Law of Practice”
(Blackburn, 1936), reference points effects, and the effects of negative versus positive reinforcements (see DANIEL,
SEALE & RAPOPORT, 1997, 18).
11The goal of at least some of these learning models is to account for individual, not aggregate behavior. To
economists individual behavior has traditionally been of interest only in so far as something can be learned about
aggregate outcomes. That is, if individual behavior differs substantially among subjects (and from theory), but
aggregate behavior or outcomes are in harmony with the theory (as the results of RAPOPORT ET AL. (1995) suggest),
most economists may be reluctant to these findings since economic theory is one of aggregate outcomes, based on
average individual behavior.
model comparison have to be developed that are widely missing today and that involve a number
of difficult problems (see BUSH, 1963, for a discussion in psychology).
9 Nevertheless, the issue
of model comparison seems crucial for the progress of this branch of research.
However, even if the problems of model comparison can be solved successfully, the question
remains what results can be expected from this type of research. I suspect that one will find a
general model of learning that applies to a variety of situations very well. Most likely there will
be a model that "fits best on average" over a certain range of games or situations, but there will
be many more models that fit better to specific situations or games since they are adjusted,
modified or calibrated. And even if a single relatively general mechanism can be found, what can
we conclude other then that some fundamental principles of learning which are well-documented
in the psychological literature indeed appear to hold in interactive settings like markets or
games?
10 These findings may be interesting per se – though more to psychologists than to
economists.
11 What economics needs today is a theory that allows us to combine findings from
learning theory and empirical evidence on learning and connect them to situations that are
economically relevant outside the laboratory.
5. Concluding Remarks
The discussion of the experimental learning literature presented in the last section may be overly
pessimistic. Indeed, if there is a basic message from this literature it is that there is a tendency
for people to adapt to the (economic) incentive structure in the long run in most settings. This
is good news since it is what economists have assumed, or at least hoped for, all the long. There
is a reservation, however, in that the message only holds provided that people have sufficient
time, incentives, information and feedback for learning. Hence, as proposed by the contingent
learning approach, learning much depends on the specific learning conditions, and further
progress is likely to be made by studying these conditions more deeply.
One of the rather robust experimental finding is that learning is relatively slow in many cases.
Thus, one may not conclude that “people do not learn“ when they are given only a few trials,– 18 –
12For instance, learning to be an entrepreneur may take time after entrepreneurship has been banned in some
countries for many decades.
possibly with low feedback, and behavioral anomalies may be an artifact of the experiment that
is diminished as subjects learn. Of course, it is a question of whether we are interested in initial
or long run behavior, but “anomalies“ should not come as a surprise when people are put into a
completely new situation such as an experiment. Thus, there is a case for “practice rounds“ in
many experiments. However, the number of these rounds as well as the behavior observed in
these rounds should be reported and analyzed more carefully, even if behavior appears to be
“noisy“ (see SLEMBECK & BRENNER, 1999, for a theory of and experimental evidence on noisy
decision making).
Furthermore, learning appears to be rather insensitive to absolute payoff magnitudes. Although
there exist no experimental studies with extremely high payoffs, data from experiments where
payoffs were linearly transformed (within the range of positive values) and data from the field
(e.g., financial markets) suggest that absolute payoff magnitudes are less important, while
learning behavior is sensitive to relative payoffs and to payoff variance (in that a higher variance
slows learning).
The basic finding that learning is often slow and sensitive to learning conditions, such as
feedback, has several implications for economics. Generally, economic actors cannot be assumed
to adapt instantaneously to new circumstances as traditional theory suggests. Real people need
time and feedback for learning, which is important not only in traditional economic settings
where relative prices, budgets, technology etc. may change, but especially when new markets or
other interaction mechanisms are implemented. Learning to behave “optimally“ may take more
time than assumed by designers, and it seems crucial to implement straightforward feedback
mechanisms. The latter is even more important when entire economies are in transition, as e.g.
in Eastern Europe, so that feedback is delayed and confounded for some possibly longer period.
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In such cases adaption is also slowed by lack of information about the rules and structure of the
emerging new economy, by uncertainty about possible further changes in the future, and by
(strategic) uncertainty about how others will behave in the new environment. This stresses the
general question of how institutions matter for learning and economic evolution, which I have
not discussed in this paper (see e.g. YOUNG, 1998, for a basic approach).
Some further implications concern the effects of economic policy in that policies may take time
to show effects not only because of delays in the political and economic system, but also due to
slow individual learning, especially when learning conditions are unfavorable. That is, whenever
a new policy is designed and people are expected to adjust or adapt to it, learning theory suggest,
i.e., that the policy involves direct feedback mechanisms and predictable rules since actors will
already be busy dealing with strategic uncertainty. A policy should also not decrease transparency– 19 –
or increase uncertainty because this would hinder learning. These are insights that some policy
advisers have shared for a long time. However, learning theories provide a new microeconomic
foundation for applied economic policy on a behavioral level.
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